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Introduction 
 What are the impacts of state policies at the local level? When the perceived effects of the 
state policies are different than the true local effects, this question becomes even more intriguing. 
Act 10 was landmark legislation that changed collective bargaining abilities of public sector 
unions in Wisconsin. The effects of state policies or federal policies at the local level has long 
been a question that has puzzled political scientists. When the policy maker does not control the 
implementation of a policy, the desired effects may not always align with the actual effects. A 
difference in perception versus intention helps explain the disconnect between policy makers and 
the people the policy impacts. 
 A nationally significant event like the implementation of Act 10 provides a convenient 
framework for an event study on the impacts of state policies at the local level when perceived 
effects may differ from the actual effects. Act 10 was believed by some to negatively impact 
teacher salaries and benefits, while others saw it simply as a means to balance the state budget. 
This dichotomy in beliefs sets the scene for an analysis of the state impacts at the local level. The 
perceived impacts seem to initially differ from the intended consequences of the legislation.  
 A survey was conducted of teachers from Wisconsin to determine their beliefs about Act 
10. The results found that most teachers still have strong opinions on Act 10 and how it affected 
them. Years after the implementation of the policy surveying teachers allows for the effects of 
the policy to be seen according to teachers. Survey respondents believed that Act 10 negatively 
affected their salary; 75.80% mostly agreed that their salary was negatively impacted by Act 10. 
These responses can be analyzed using salary data to see if the perceived effects of Act 10 on 
teachers’ salaries match the actual effects.  
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 To analyze the effects of the policy further, this study will look at salaries of teachers in 
Wisconsin before and after Act 10 and compare them to another state that has not had sweeping 
legislation like Act 10. Missouri has not had legislation focusing on unions like Act 10. In fact, 
in 2007 the Missouri Supreme Court confirmed that collective bargaining applied to teachers. 
This comparison would allow for a difference in policy impact to be seen depending on the 
results of the salary comparisons. It is fair to say that there are differing opinions on the bill, and 
to fairly analyze the opinions, salaries in each state will be measured. 
 Initial empirical results differ between the perceived and actual effects of this study’s 
participants. Upon empirical analysis of salaries in Wisconsin and Missouri, it was found that 
salaries in Wisconsin did not go down following Act 10 as was commonly believed among 
opponents of the legislation. This is an example of the perceived impacts of a state policy not 
matching the actual impacts of a policy at the local level. What the policy makers wanted, what 
the teachers believed, and what happened, were not consistent.   
History of Act 10 
 Wisconsin has historically been a stronghold of organized labor. Labor unions in 
Wisconsin date back as far as the 19th century, when bricklayers and carpenters in Milwaukee 
defined themselves as an organized union as early as 1847.1  Specifically, teachers’ unions have 
had a prevalent presence in the state for some time. The state boasted well above the national 
average in union membership rates until 2014.  
                                                             
1 Wisconsin Historical Society. “The Early Labor Movement in Wisconsin.”  Wisconsin 
 Historical Society. https://www.wisconsinhistory.org/Records/Article/CS1709 
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Figure 1. Union membership was above the national average in Wisconsin, but on the decline in Wisconsin prior to Act 10 
As seen in Figure 1, union membership was above average, but on the decline prior to Act 10 
according to The Bureau of Labor Statistics, and did not drop below the national average until 
three years after Act 10.  
 Prior to Act 10 unions had higher membership, offered benefits that exceeded most in the 
nation, and seemed to boast significant political clout. Teachers paid roughly 6% of their 
healthcare premiums and very little into their pensions. The Journal Sentinel cited that Wisconsin 
teachers were receiving the 4th highest benefits in the nation at $1,145 per pupil, 50% above the 
national average.2 Then came Act 10 which would bring sweeping changes to many of the things 
that unions believed could never be changed.  
                                                             
2 Umhoefer, Dave. “For Unions in Wisconsin, a Fast and Hard Fall since Act 10 | Journal 
 Sentinel - Jsonline.com.” 2018. https://projects.jsonline.com/news/2016/11/27/for-
 unions-in-wisconsin-fast-and-hard-fall-since-act-10.html (February 11, 2018). 
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 Act 10, or as Governor Scott Walker coined it, the “Budget Repair Bill”, brought about 
massive changes to collective bargaining, benefit structures, Medicaid, and debt structuring in 
Wisconsin. The office of the Governor first stated in a press release that the state was facing an 
immediate $137 million deficit and a projected $3.6 billion budget shortfall.3 The bi-annual 
budget process in Wisconsin requires balanced budgets per Section 5 of Article VIII of the State 
Constitution. Furthermore, the State Constitution requires that the deficit incurred prior to 
Governor Walker taking office under the previous budget, be fixed immediately, stating that, “If 
the imbalance occurs in the second fiscal year of a biennium, the adjustment has to be made in 
the first fiscal year of the next biennial budget.” Therefore, immediate action to fix the budget 
was Constitutionally required.4 An initial impact seen from the bill was that 1,500 public workers 
received notices they would be laid off to correct the deficit. Those notices were rescinded as of 
the passage of the bill on March 11th.5 
The most controversial portion of the legislation was regarding the changes to collective 
bargaining and employee compensation. There were also changes to debt restructuring and 
Medicaid to help balance the budget, but those were not seen as the main attack by opponents of 
the bill. The bill made significant changes to collective bargaining, prohibiting wages from 
increasing above a cap based on the Consumer Price Index unless approved by a referendum. 
                                                             
3 The Office of the Governor. 2011. “Emergency measure is needed to balance the state budget 
 and give government the tools to manage during economic crisis.” The Office of the 
 Governor. https://walker.wi.gov/press-releases/governor-walker-introduces-budget-
 repair. 
4 Pugh, Christa. 2017. “Informational Paper 74.” Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau. 
 https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lfb/informational_papers/january_2017/0074_state
 _general_fund_balanced_budget_requirements_informational_paper_74.pdf 
5 Condon, Stephanie. 2011. “Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker signs anti-unions bill – but 
 Democrats say they’re the political victors.” CBS. 
 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/wisconsin-gov-scott-walker-signs-anti-union-bill-but-
 democrats-say-theyre-the-political-victors/ 
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Collective bargaining units (e.g., unions) would be allowed, but would require a yearly vote to 
maintain certification and to receive the benefits of a collective bargaining unit. These units also 
came with the caveat that teachers where these organizations remained, were no longer required 
to pay dues. The specific monetary changes from the legislation were that state employees would 
be required to pay 12.6% of the average cost of premiums and the current premiums would have 
to be cut by at least 5%. This cutting of premiums would no longer allow the Wisconsin 
Education Association Council (WEAC) to keep their own insurance company locked into 
business through their contract negotiations.6 This change to health insurance premiums was also 
to be compensated by the Department of Employee Trust Funds which was authorized to use $28 
million of excess balance to reduce these costs.7 Wisconsin Retirement System also estimated 
that following Act 10 teachers would now pay 5.8% into their pension plans.  
Teachers and teachers’ unions predicted the effects of the legislation to be extremely 
negative for teachers across the state. The polarization of the topic led to two very different 
perceived effects of the legislation. Some saw the legislation as a way for the taxpayers to take 
back control from unions who were using political clout, fundraising ability, and organizational 
abilities to elect school board members who they would later bargain their contracts with.  Union 
members believed the political clout of their unions was significantly harmed and would be 
forever. They further believed the legislation removed many of the uses of being part of a union. 
The reasoning behind the specific effects on unions was that there would be a long-lasting 
                                                             
6Umhoefer, Dave.“For Unions in Wisconsin, a Fast and Hard Fall since Act 10 | Journal Sentinel  
 - Jsonline.com.” https://projects.jsonline.com/news/2016/11/27/for-unions-in-wisconsin-
 fast-and-hard-fall-since-act-10.html (February 11, 2018). 
7The Office of the Governor. 2011. “Emergency measure is needed to balance the state budget 
 and give government the tools to manage during economic crisis.” The Office of the  
 Governor. https://walker.wi.gov/press-releases/governor-walker-introduces-budget-
 repair. 
7 
 
impact to solve budget issues. This is why union members believed there to be a long-lasting 
negative impact on their ability to have power and use it efficiently. Furthermore, teachers said 
they would see significant decreases in their take-home pay, as well as little to no representation 
because of the weakening of unions. Overall, teachers believed that the policy was going to have 
incredibly negative impacts on them from their pay to their class size to their sick time. Teachers 
also believed that nobody would want to teach in the state and the entire sector would no longer 
be appealing. 
Along with teachers, Democrats in the state assembly strongly opposed the bill 
immediately following its release. Knowing the bill would easily be passed by a majority 
Republican legislature, some fled the state to avoid a vote on the matter. By leaving the state, the 
bill could not be voted on because Wisconsin legislature rules require a quorum for voting on 
legislation with spending stipulations. The governor could enforce the legal obligation of the 
Democrats to vote by a police order; however, Governor Walker could not send state police 
across state lines to physically bring the Democrats to vote. Additionally, Republicans took steps 
to try and coerce Democrats back to the state such as, requiring Democrats to pay out of pocket 
to make copies in their offices and fining them up to $100 a day. Ultimately, Republicans altered 
spending portions of the legislation so a quorum was not needed to vote on the legislation under 
Wisconsin’s legislative rules.  
Immediately following the February 11th announcement of the landmark legislation 
teachers took to the streets to protect their unions. Doctors wrote sick notes so teachers could be 
out of school, students walked out of classes in defense of their teachers, and over 100,000 
protestors filled the capital for weeks. This legislation was viewed by teachers and Democrats as 
a direct attack on teachers and unions. Furthering the feelings of attack, the legislation did not 
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apply to other public-sector unions such as fire-fighters and police officers. The anger following 
passage of the bill culminated in a recall petition of the governor; it gained enough signatures to 
initiate a special election, which ultimately ended in a recall election that gained national 
attention and was won by Governor Walker (the only time in U.S. history an incumbent governor 
had won a recall election).   
This history of Act 10 is vital to grasp an understanding of why the topic is such a hot-
button issue in Wisconsin. Now seven years following Act 10, we have data available to analyze 
the impacts the policy may have had at the local level. Some initial studies analyzed the 
aggregate benefits or disadvantages to districts and taxpayers, but none analyzed teachers 
specifically. The MacIver Institute and EducationNext showed that districts such as the Appleton 
Area School District saved $3.1 million by opening up their healthcare plans to options besides 
the expensive collectively bargained benefits prior to Act 10. Similarly, Hudson saw $1.1 million 
saved and Madison saw $10 million saved.8 Politicians also claimed to see the benefits. Mayor 
Jim Schmitt of Green Bay says the plan saved taxpayers time, because, “the focus of managing 
the city’s 1,000 employees was away from debating a union contract.” He further claimed the 
residents of Brown County had saved $118 million in pension payments by employees. 9  
In addressing the concern that no teachers would want to teach in Wisconsin following 
Act 10, CNN offered some supporting evidence. CNN found that 10.5% of teachers left the 
                                                             
8D’Andrea, Christian. 2013. “Limits on Collective Bargaining.” Education Next. 
 http://educationnext.org/limits-on-collective-bargaining/ (October 17, 2017). 
9 MacIver Institute. “It’s Working Wisconsin.” 2017. http://www.maciverinstitute.com/its-
 working-wisconsin/ (October 31, 2017). 
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sector following 2010-2011, which was up from 6.4% the year prior. 10  However, this result is 
contradicted by a study from Wisconsin Policy Forum which found that teacher retention is not 
attributable to Act 10. Instead the study found that districts have been able to replace teachers 
lost, but now struggle to retain young teachers. Furthermore, they claim that these fluctuations in 
teacher retention were not a result of Act 10 as they were on par with the national changes to the 
teaching industry.11  
 
Figure 2. Wisconsin Policy Forum graph supports CNN claims, but WPF suggests these fit national trends and were not a result 
of Act 10. 
                                                             
10 “Here’s What Happened to Teachers after Wisconsin Gutted Its Unions - Nov. 17, 2017.” 
 http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/17/news/economy/wisconsin-act-10-teachers/index.html 
 (March 30, 2018). 
11 Wisconsin Taxpayers Alliance. 2018. “Wisconsin’s Teacher Workforce: Trends in supply and 
 turnover.” Wisconsin Taxpayers Alliance. http://wistax.org/publication/wisconsins-
 teacher-workforce-trends-in-supply-and-turnover.  
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The history and deeply polarized beliefs on Act 10 make this an extremely interesting 
topic to many Wisconsinites. Union members, taxpayers, concerned citizens, and academics 
alike all have a vested interest in answering some questions about Act 10. The academic 
literature surrounding the topic which closely analyzes laws that impact unions, how unions 
operate, and benefits or disadvantages to unions, is much broader than the precise topic of this 
paper.  
Literature  
 The literature on local effects of state policies, how unions organize, changes in union 
membership over time, the benefits of unions, laws that have affected unions, and the impact 
unions have locally is rather expansive. While this body of literature and research covers all 
these topics individually, the field lacks a cohesive piece comparing perceived and actual effects 
of state policies. There is a general lack of substantial research in the field regarding Act 10 itself 
and how the framing of the debate may have impacted perceived effects. This piece however, 
will analyze the perceived effects locally of a policy versus the actual effects, and how the 
framing of a state policy in the public sphere can drastically change how people view the policy 
even if the actual effects do not align with the perceived effects.  
 Looking at the effects of state policies on localities can be a building block for looking at 
perceived local effect and actual local effect. Fuhrman and Elmore demonstrated that state 
policies do not cause significant changes at the local level because the implementers have the 
majority of control over how the policy is put into place.12 Furthermore, these policies may not 
                                                             
12 Fuhrman, Susan H., and Richard F. Elmore. 1990. “Understanding Local Control in the Wake 
 of State Education Reform.” Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 12(1): 82–96. 
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even be effectively being measured as McDermott finds that these state policies are often 
measured by broad indicators which do not typically do justice to the policies or accurately 
measure their effects.13 Another problem with policies coming from larger forms of government 
is demonstrated by Marsh and Wohlstetter, who find that government policies written to impact 
local levels, do not necessarily fully reflect all local laws already in place which creates a 
division between what the policies are intended to do and what they will actually do.14 Often 
times these state policies come with preconceived notions, especially on a partisan level. 
Edward’s findings demonstrated that often government policies that impact a specific group can 
lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy which can create an organizational crisis.15 
Understanding how unions organize and why they organize, is important when analyzing 
the impacts a policy will have on them. According to Hannaway and Rotherham, unions are 
crucial because “collective bargaining shapes the way public schools are organized, financed, 
staffed, and operated. Understanding collective bargaining in education and its impact on the 
day-to-day life of schools is critical to designing and implementing reforms that will successfully 
raise student achievement.”16 That being said, when policies impact those uses, Salancik and 
Pfeffer found that unions will band together to either change their political environment or they 
                                                             
13 McDermott, Kathryn A. 2003. “What Causes Variation in States’ Accountability Policies?” 
 Peabody Journal of Education 78(4): 153–76. 
14 Marsh, Julie A., and Priscilla Wohlstetter. 2013. “Recent Trends in Intergovernmental 
 Relations: The Resurgence of Local Actors in Education Policy.” Educational 
 Researcher 42(5): 276–83. 
15 John C. Edwards. 2001. “Self-Fulfilling Prophecy and Escalating Commitment: Fuel for the 
 Waco Fire.” The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 37(3): 343–60. 
16 Hannaway, Jane, and Andrew Rotherham. 2010. Collective Bargaing in Education: 
 Negotiating Change in Today’s Schools. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Education 
 Press. 
12 
 
will form interorganizational groups to absorb potential policy impacts.17 Trejo’s research 
showed that unions do not hold as much political clout as Salancik and Pfeffer might argue, but 
they do work as a strong collective cost saving measure.18 Strunk and Grissom take a different 
approach, arguing that stronger unions do hold government control, not because of their political 
clout, but because of their ability to create stronger collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) 
which leave little to no room for government policies. This means the amount of meaningful 
choices or impacts policies and administrators can have are minimal. On the flip side this 
literature also found that weak unions lead to administrators having the majority of control over 
their districts.19  
Unions seem to organize well and initially there seems to be great upside to 
memberships; however, research has found that membership fluctuates greatly over time. In 
1974, 1 in 4 workers were members of a union, public or private. As of 2004, only 8.2% of 
private employees were union members. Public union membership had fallen to 37.1%.20 
Ichniowski and Zax found similar results regarding the decline in union membership and 
explained that he believes it is because of “substantial reductions in union membership due to 
right-to-work laws. Free riders, rather than anti-union sentiments, are probably responsible.”21 
                                                             
17 Salancik, Gerald R., and Jeffrey Pfeffer. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
 Dependence Perspective. Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 336, 
 www.sup.org/books/title/?id=5889 (April 10, 2018).  
18 Trejo, Stephen J. 1991. “Public Sector Unions and Municipal Employment.” Industrial and 
 Labor Relations Review 45(1): 166–180. 
19 Strunk, Katharine O., and Jason A. Grissom. 2010. “Do Strong Unions Shape District Policies? 
 Collective Bargaining, Teacher Contract Restrictiveness, and the Political Power of 
 Teachers’ Unions.” Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 32(3): 389–406. 
20 Hannaway, Jane, and Andrew Rotherham. 2010. Collective Bargaining in Education: 
 Negotiating Change in Today’s Schools. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Education 
 Press. 
21 Ichniowski, Casey, and Jeffrey S. Zax. 1991. “Right-to-Work Laws, Free Riders, and 
 Unionization in the Local Public Sector.” Journal of Labor Economics 9(3): 255–75. 
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Wisconsin has seen similar fluctuations in membership according to the literature as well. Even 
in historically strong union districts like Milwaukee and Madison there was drop off. Milwaukee 
Teachers’ Education Association has lost 30% of its membership since 2011. Prior to Act 10 
union members were 14.2% of all people employed in the state, as of 2015 that number was 
down to 8.3%.22 
 Part of why unions exist is to gain the benefits that come with being organized together. 
This organization allows for union representation which allows for better benefits for members. 
However, union membership is key to bargain effectively according to Blakemore and Faith.23 
Unions typically are intended to benefit members by showing unity, increasing salaries, 
bargaining better benefits, and representing a large group. Winter and Grimes and Register’s 
works show that unionized school districts pay experienced teachers up to 25% more than 
districts that do not have union representation.24  Unionized districts also tend to carry this 
positive impact on salary to districts around them. Grimes and Register found that when a district 
is unionized and receives a 1% pay increase, pay in a nearby district sees at least a 0.52% 
increase.25 On the contrary, Eberts found that districts that have unionized teachers cost the 
                                                             
22 “For Unions in Wisconsin, a Fast and Hard Fall since Act 10 | Journal Sentinel - 
 Jsonline.com.” https://projects.jsonline.com/news/2016/11/27/for-unions-in-wisconsin-
 fast-and-hard-fall-since-act-10.html (February 11, 2018). 
23 Blakemore, Arthur E., and Roger L. Faith. 1989. “Bargaining Effect and Membership Effect in 
 Public Sector Unions.” Southern Economic Journal 55(4): 908–23. 
24 Winters, John V. 2011. “Teacher Salaries and Teacher Unions: A Spatial Econometric 
 Approach.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 64(4): 747–64. 
25 Grimes, Paul W., and Charles A. Register. 1990. “Teachers’ Unions and Student Achievement 
 in High School Economics.” The Journal of Economic Education 21(3): 297–306. 
14 
 
district 15% more than non-union districts.26 This ability to impact districts outside of their own 
shows the far-reaching effects unionization can have. 
 There are many examples of states that have legislation in place that directly impacts 
unions. Unions can have extended impacts such as, their negotiated benefits setting a bar for 
neighboring districts. Lindy found that in New Mexico mandatory teachers’ union laws impacted 
student performance. Lower performing students performed worse; however, higher achieving 
students were shown to do better.27 Eberts (1987) had earlier works that found that unionized 
districts raised student performance by 3%.28 However, later Eberts found the impacts of unions 
were lowering the performance of already low performing students and raising high 
performers.29 However, Moe has conducted research which found contrary effects; unionization 
in California hurt student performance, especially minority students.30 Biasi analyzed the impact 
that union laws have on teacher quality rather than student performance and found that Act 10 
had positive impacts on teacher quality in Wisconsin. She specifically found that changes to pay 
schemes led to high-quality teachers coming into Wisconsin and low-quality teachers going out 
which she found, “Leads to improvement of the overall workforce.”31 Lovenheim found that 
unions in fact have no real impact on teacher pay, benefits, or teacher performance. The main 
                                                             
26 Eberts, Randall W. 2007. “Teachers Unions and Student Performance: Help or Hindrance?” 
 The Future of Children 17(1): 175–200 
27 Lindy, Benjamin. 2011. “The Impact of Teacher Collective Bargaining Laws on Student 
 Achievement: Evidence from a New Mexico Natural Experiment.” The Yale Law Journal 
 120(5): 1130–91. 
28 Eberts, Randall W., and Joe A. Stone. 1987. “Teacher Unions and the Productivity of Public 
 Schools.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40(3): 354–63. 
29 Eberts, Randall W. 2007. “Teachers Unions and Student Performance: Help or Hindrance?” 
 The Future of Children 17(1): 175–200 
30 Moe, Terry M. 2009. “Collective Bargaining and the Performance of the Public Schools.” 
 American Journal of Political Science 53(1): 156–74. 
31 Biasi, Barbara. “Unions, Salaries, and the Market for Teachers: Evidence from Wisconsin.” 
 2016.  https://web.stanford.edu/~bbiasi/jmp.pdf (October 1, 2017). 
15 
 
impact was an increased number of teachers hired by unionized districts of 5%.32 This literature 
clearly demonstrates the wide array of potential local impacts state policies on unions can have.  
 When analyzing legislation that pointedly impacted unions it is vital to understand these 
aspects laid out in other literature. Understanding how unions form, why they form, how they 
have changed over time, benefits they offer, how they impact performance and district costs, and 
how laws have impacted them are all helpful in tying together the main research question of the 
paper. To determine if perceived effects of state policy differ from the actual effects how unions 
form, why they form, and benefits that are gained from unionization all may impact the 
perceived effects of a policy.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
 I believe that the strong negative opinions from teachers regarding Act 10 are still very 
prevalent today some 7 years later. To accurately measure if the perceived effects match the 
actual effects, one must demonstrate that the perceived effects are all still there and have not 
faded with time. To accurately measure the impacts Act 10 has had to this day, the polarization 
behind the topic must be confirmed. If teachers still have strong negative opinions regarding Act 
10 and believe the policy had negative effects and continues to do so, the perceived effect will 
obviously be negative. This means that if the perception does not match the empirical analysis of 
salaries, then the political rhetoric and accuracy of said perception should be called into question. 
Union strength could also impact this rhetoric because if a union is strong with many 
connections, their message can be easily spread. 
                                                             
32 Lovenheim, Michael F. 2009. “The Effect of Teachers’ Unions on Education Production: 
 Evidence from Union Election Certifications in Three Midwestern States.” Journal of 
 Labor Economics 27(4): 525–87. 
16 
 
 If strong Wisconsin unions saw this legislation as an attempt to weaken their political 
clout and a direct attack, then they would strike back with passion to show their strength and 
ability to come together. This outcome seems likely considering the Governor’s recall election 
that followed soon after Act 10 passed.  
 If teachers still feel strongly about Act 10 and think the policy had significant impacts, 
then the impact of the state policy at the local level, according to teachers, initially can be 
believed to have been significant. Perceived local effects can be measured by surveying teachers 
regarding their feelings about their autonomy, relationships with administrators, their salary 
impacts, benefit impacts, and union membership. When surveyed, if teachers voice strong 
negative opinions about Act 10, it will demonstrate a perceived negative effect of the policy at 
the local level. Current union membership may also be an indicator of teacher feelings regarding 
Act 10. However, even if teachers are not union members, or never were union members, I 
believe they will still have negative opinions regarding Act 10. Furthermore, if teachers are truly 
as passionate about Act 10, as I believe, the survey will show, as was heard in the media, and 
from union leaders, negative responses will be seen from most teachers.  
 If many of these teachers claim the policy had negative effects, especially on their salary, 
then salaries before and after Act 10 can either bolster or cast doubt on their claims. While 
benefits like health insurance cannot be sufficiently analyzed because of WEAC’s strong hold on 
insurance costs through contract negotiations and data availability, salaries can certainly be 
analyzed to determine the true local effects of Act 10. As stated earlier prior to Act 10, 
Wisconsin teachers were receiving some of the best benefits in the nation. Upon implementation 
of Act 10 there were significant changes to the structuring of benefits. Districts could now open 
their health insurance plans to any insurers to save money. This change in how each district 
17 
 
would spend when it came to benefits makes it nearly impossible to quantify the impacts Act 10 
may have had on benefits specifically. This is because teachers could be receiving the same 
quality of benefits for substantially less money, but the statistics reported are the amount spent 
on benefits per teacher, which will clearly go down as the law stated it had to. Teachers’ salaries 
on the other hand have not had the significant changes to their overall structure like benefits 
have, so they can be used for analysis. If teachers’ salaries in Wisconsin in comparison to 
Missouri did not go down like many claimed following Act 10, then the political framing, 
perceived effects, and actual local effects of the policy do not align. Soon after the passage of 
Act 10, it was reported by EducationNext that many districts were able to use the new flexibility 
they received to turn deficits into surpluses and hire more teachers, which potentially 
demonstrates an initial positive impact. This study demonstrates that salaries may have, in fact, 
not gone down, and the local effect was not negative, as was perceived by teachers and 
propagated by unions. 
 Three main hypotheses can summarize my beliefs going into the empirical research. One, 
if state policies like Act 10, have a significant impact at the local level as was perceived, drastic 
changes to teacher salaries will also be seen. Two, if teachers’ responses show strong opinions or 
emotions on state policies, this will indicate a belief that there was a significant effect on their 
district, although it may not fit the true effects. Finally, if empirical analysis of teacher salaries 
does not fit the rhetoric that was used by unions and beliefs held by teachers, the debate around 
the effects of the policy were framed incorrectly, and the perceived effects do not match the 
actual effects of the policy. 
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Methods 
 To first establish that there is a potential disconnect between the perceived effects of the 
policy and the actual effects teachers were surveyed to determine their overall feelings regarding 
Act 10. Teacher salaries in Wisconsin and Missouri were gathered from the Wisconsin 
Department of Instruction (DPI), and Missouri administrator’s data collection. Then the data was 
used to determine if salaries in Wisconsin truly did go down as was assumed to be the case from 
most of the responses from teachers in the survey. This assumption comes from media coverage 
and very clear union rhetoric surrounding Act 10. Creating the structure of the survey to 
accurately gauge the feelings of teachers in Wisconsin required questions to be sensitive of 
strong political sentiments behind Act 10, but also straightforward enough to get honest 
opinions.  
  I designed a 30-question survey that covered topics including years of experience, 
feelings about the K-12 state budget, Common Core, Act 10, union membership, and union 
usefulness. These statements and their exact wording can be found in Appendix A. The goal was 
to be able to achieve an accurate measure of teacher opinions regarding Act 10. Teachers were 
asked initially non-political questions such as their education level, experience, and grade level 
before being asked more specific questions regarding politics which may have turned off some 
respondents if they were the initial questions. 3,561 teachers were emailed the survey. Nineteen 
addresses bounced back. 3,542 were contacted of which 250 responded for a response rate of 
7.06%, which is considered an acceptable response rate for contemporary research.33 However, 
                                                             
33 Ramshaw, Adam. “The Complete Guide to Acceptable Survey Response Rates.” 2017. 
 Genroe. https://www.genroe.com/blog/acceptable-survey-response-rate/11504 (April 11, 
 2018). 
19 
 
this response rate is most likely artificially low because some teachers are likely to have missed 
the survey due to spam filtering or because they avoided the politically sensitive topic. If fewer 
teachers actually saw the survey than the 3,542 that were emailed, the response rate would 
naturally be higher. This response rate does create room for substantial response bias where only 
teachers with strong beliefs saw this survey as a chance to sound off about the policy. However, 
events like the attempted recall of Governor Walker can be pointed to as evidence that a wide 
group of teachers felt strongly about Act 10 and the response results represent that.   
 These teachers were surveyed from a variety of geographical areas across the state: 
Madison, Manitowoc, Racine, Cedarburg, West Bend, Green Bay, Appleton, Hortonville, La 
Crosse, Bay Port, and Marshfield. The districts also leaned different directions politically, as of 
the 2016 presidential election. For Example, Madison and La Crosse were some of the districts 
that tended to vote for Democrats and Hortonville and Appleton among those which leaned 
Republican. These districts were chosen because they had varying degrees of implementation of 
Act 10, typically varying political leanings, and varying size of district. Some of these districts 
made significant changes to things like their handbooks, which is a set of guidelines the district 
will follow regarding topics such as class sizes, sick days, and most importantly, pay scales. 
Other districts took advantage of the freedom Act 10 granted them to change health insurance 
plans and the percentage teachers pay of their premiums.  
 The survey questions themselves were phrased as statements on a scale from strongly 
agree to disagree or do not care, with 10 being strongly agreeing. Once all the teachers’ answers 
were received, the answers were then scaled down to 1-5. Now 5 represented strongly agreeing 
and 1 being disagreeing or not caring. This allowed for consistent interpretation of coefficients 
and keep the integrity of the original scaling format. Teachers were asked to rank multiple 
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statements regarding Act 10 in the survey. A teacher’s answer across all these statements was 
averaged to create an “Act 10 Score”. This method of aggregating and averaging was defensible 
by the summary statistics which showed that the majority of teachers consistently had strong 
views one way or the other across all Act 10 statements. The average of the Act 10 Score for the 
sample was a 4, meaning they mostly agreed that Act 10 was negative most of the time.  
 These survey responses were used in an ordered logit regression. Since the responses are 
coded as multichotomous values, an ordered logit regression is the appropriate statistical model 
to account for potential outputs.34 Teachers were asked if unions make them better educators, if 
the K-12 state budget was bad for education, if unions make them feel better represented, their 
years of experience, and if they were currently a union member. These questions were used as 
variables in the regression equation below.   
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
= 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑡 10 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑠𝐵𝑎𝑑
+ 𝐵3𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵4𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 
+ 𝐵5𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑎 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 + 𝑢 
By taking these results and plotting the predicted probabilities of their opinions on Act 10 
changing and the other variables held constant it can be demonstrated that teacher feelings 
regarding Act 10 are closely related to their feelings that unions make teachers better at their 
profession. 
 
                                                             
34 Andrew S. Fullerton. 2009. “A Conceptual Framework for Ordered Logistic Regression 
 Models.” Sociological Methods & Research 38(2): 306–47. 
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Results 
 Table 1 shows the strong feelings that were seen in the initial survey data. The vast 
majority (75.80%) of teachers at least mostly agree that Act 10 negatively impacted their salary. 
Similarly, a large majority (85.84%) have overall negative feelings about Act 10. The Average 
Act 10 Score was used in the regression; however, the feelings on average for the questions 
regarding Act 10 were not nearly as strongly negative as when asked directly about salary 
impacts.  
 
 Don't 
Care 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Act 10 Score 0.42% 3.75% 10.00% 50.42% 35.42% 
Act 10 Negatively Impacted 
Salary 
4.57% 2.28% 17.35% 22.83% 52.97% 
 
Table 1. Response percentages of the survey questions. 
 
Table 2 shows the regression results of the proportional ordered logit regression. All of the 
coefficients are statistically significant, and can be more easily interpreted by analyzing a graph 
of the predicted probabilities.  
 
 Coefficient Value Std. Error T value 
Act 10 Score 0.8498     *** 0.21870 3.886 
State Budget is Bad 0.4462     *** 0.12685 3.517 
Unions=BetterPoliticalRep. 0.9199     *** 0.12011 7.659 
Currently a Union Member 1.0867     *** 0.27901 3.895 
Experience -0.1821    ** 0.09290 -1.960 
 ** p < .05 *** p < .01  
 
Table 2. Proportional ordered logit regression results. 
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All variables in the predicted probabilities graphs are being held constant at their average 
value from the survey besides the Act 10 Score. Whether a teacher is currently in a union was 
held constant at 0, meaning they are assumed to be currently not in a union. There is a correlation 
between the idea that unions make educators better and the belief that Act 10 was incredibly 
negative. This would indicate a perceived local effect from Act 10 creating worse education 
because educators would no longer be better if their unions had been dismantled.  
 
Figure 3. Predicated probabilities graph holding all variables constant at their average value. 
Figure 3 shows that the average teacher somewhat agreed with the statement that unions make 
them better educators. If unions were dismantled by Act 10 as was believed by many teachers 
and union members, unions can no longer make educators better which would indicate a 
significant local effect of Act 10. While this figure demonstrates the average response rate, the 
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maximum response rate for Act 10 Score was a 5, which Table 1 showed was not an insignificant 
portion of the respondents, provides further insight into the perceived local beliefs and how they 
may have been framed.  
  
 
Figure 4. Predicted probabilities graph with the maximum Act 10 Score and holding all other variables constant at the average. 
Figure 4 once again shows a strong connection between thinking Act 10 was bad and that 
unions make teachers better educators. However, the probability of strongly agreeing or mostly 
agreeing is substantially higher than was seen in Figure 3. These correlations demonstrate that 
there was clear perceived effect locally that Act 10 had a negative effect. This correlation is 
further seen when analyzing teachers who responded at the minimum Act 10 Score which shows 
a considerably weaker belief that unions make them better educators.  
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Figure 5. Predicted probabilities graph with Act 10 Score at the minimum and all other variables held constant at the average. 
Figure 5 helps further establish that there may be some framing or rhetoric that is 
impacting teacher beliefs about Act 10. Teachers who think Act 10 was overall very negative 
also tend to think that unions make them better educators. This expands on the belief that there 
was most likely political framing behind the perceived effects of Act 10 that may not have been 
correct. Considering the close correlation between the belief that unions make educators better 
and that Act 10 was bad the connection can easily be made that teachers who thought unions 
were great also think Act 10 negatively impacted them in all aspects of the policy. Next, the 
perceived effects that Act 10 negatively impacted teacher salaries can be analyzed to determine if 
this perception is true or the remnants of unions rhetoric. This leads to the necessity of the next 
analysis of data, did teachers truly see salary decreases? So, I turn to an empirical test of this 
perception that Act 10 negatively affected salaries. 
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Salary Data 
 If teacher salaries do not reflect the perceived impacts they stated, there is a clear 
disconnect between the rhetoric, framing, and perception of the effects and the true local effects. 
Teacher salaries from 2009-2016 were gathered from Missouri and Wisconsin. Missouri was 
chosen as a comparison state due to availability of comparable data, its lack of Act 10-like union 
legislation, and its geographical location. Missouri had the most accessible data, but also served 
as a valuable comparison because states like Indiana and Ohio passed legislation changing 
collective bargaining abilities of public unions. Missouri also codified union abilities to 
collectively bargain their contracts in the 2007 Missouri Supreme Court case where it was found 
that “all public employees, including teachers, (have) the right to bargain collectively and reach 
binding agreements.”35 
 The salaries are from administrative data and the Wisconsin Department of Instruction. 
The data was cleaned so that teachers could be individually identified and matched from year to 
year. This created a data set that had a teacher’s unique identifier (ID number), year, experience, 
and salary for each year they taught. The salaries were then adjusted for inflation using the US 
Department of Labor’s Consumer Price Index, using 2016 as the base year. This allowed for 
state, year, and experience to all be controlled for when running linear regressions. I will first 
examine salaries in two specific years, the year immediately prior to Act 10 (2009) and 
immediately following Act 10 (2011). Next, I will examine salaries over the full time frame of 
the data (2009-2016).  
                                                             
35 Missouri National Education Association. “Collective Bargaining FAQs.” Missouri National 
 Education Association. https://www.mnea.org/Missouri/BargainingFAQ.aspx.  
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Salary Results 
 Table 3 shows the average salary for teachers both before Act 10 (2009) and after Act 10 
(2011) in Wisconsin and Missouri. Before Act 10, the average salary in Wisconsin was 
$44,834.43. After Act 10, the average salary in Wisconsin rose to $49,246.25, an increase of 
$4,411.82. Similarly, in Missouri the average salary was initially $38,450.76 and rose to 
$41,356.19, an increase of $2,905.43. While the average salary increased over this time in both 
states, salaries in Wisconsin increased by an additional $1,506.39. This value, $1,506.39, is 
known as the “difference-in-differences” estimate. 
 Similarly, this same difference-in-differences estimate can be obtained by comparing the 
average salary across the two states within each time period, and then observing if the difference 
between states grows over time. Before Act 10, the average salary was $6,638.67 higher in 
Wisconsin. Following Act 10, this difference in average salary grew to $7,890.06, an increase of 
$1,506.39.  
  WI MO WI-MO 
Pre-Act 10 $44,834.43 $38,450.76 $6,383.67 
Post-Act 10 $49,246.25 $41,356.19 $7,890.06 
Post - Pre $4,411.82 $2,905.43 $1,506.39 
 
Table 3. The bolded and underlined value is the difference of the difference of Pre-Act 10 and Post Act 10. 
This difference-in-differences estimate can also be obtained via linear regression by 
estimating the following model:  
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑦2011𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑊𝐼𝑖 ⋅ 𝑦2011𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
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where 𝑊𝐼𝑖 = 1 indicates that teacher 𝑖 is in Wisconsin and 𝑊𝐼𝑖 = 0 indicates that teacher 𝑖 is in 
Missouri, 𝑦2011𝑡 = 1 for year 𝑡 = 2011 and 𝑦2011𝑡 = 0 for year 𝑡 = 2009, and the 
interaction 𝑊𝐼𝑖 ⋅ 𝑦2011𝑡 = 1 for a teacher in Wisconsin in 2011 and equals 0 otherwise. Table 4 
shows the results of this model. 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. T-statistic 95% Confidence Interval 
Intercept 38450.76 42.56 903.49*** 38367.34 38534.17 
WI 6383.67 62.71 101.8*** 6260.77 6506.57 
y2011 2905.43 63.00 46.11*** 2781.94 3028.92 
WI y2011 1506.39 92.68 16.25*** 1324.73 1688.04 
 
Table 4. Difference-in-differences estimate using salaries from 2009 and 2011. n=259,399, R2=0.105 
As shown in Table 4, the estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term, ?̂?3 = 1506.39, is the 
same difference-in-differences estimate as shown in Table 3.  
The results shown in Tables 3 and 4 only consider salaries in two years, 2009 and 2011. 
Next, we will examine salaries from all years in the data. Before examining the difference-in-
differences model for multiple years we will examine the trends of average salary over time by 
estimating the following model:  
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑦2009𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑦2011𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽8𝑦2016𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
The results of this model are shown in Figure 6. Coefficient estimates and standard errors for this 
and all remaining models are shown in Appendix B.  
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Figure 6. Trends of teacher salaries from 2009-2016 with a constant average difference between states. 
Figure 6 shows the average increase in salary over this time-period. This model allows for 
average salaries in Wisconsin to be greater over this time-period, but restricts this difference to 
be the same in all years. In other words, this does not allow for a difference-in-differences 
estimate.  
 To allow for a difference-in-differences estimate, similar to Tables 3 and 4 except for all 
years, we need to allow for the effect of each year to be different in Wisconsin or Missouri. 
Figure 7 shows results of this model.  
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Figure 7. Difference-in-differences estimate, similar to Tables 3 and 4, showing an increase in average salary following Act 10.  
 Looking at Figure 7 and comparing years 2009 and 2011 we see a similar pattern as the 
one shown in Tables 3 and 4. Salaries in both states increase; the increase is larger in Wisconsin. 
Between 2011 and 2016 this difference in average salaries between Wisconsin and Missouri does 
not go away.    
The results shown thus far are not consistent with a decrease in teacher salaries following 
the passage of Act 10 and, if anything, demonstrate an increase in salaries. One of the aspects of 
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contract negotiation that changed as a result of Act 10 was experience-based pay. The following 
models will examine the effect of experience on salary.  
The model shown in Figure 8 controls for experience. All other aspects of the model 
remain unchanged. As we see, after controlling for experience, average salaries in both states 
follow a similar pattern as shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 8. Difference-in-differences estimate, controlling for experience. 
The model in Figure 8 controls for the effect of experience on salary, but restricts the 
impact to be the same for both states. Figure 9 relaxes this restriction, allowing the effect of 
experience on salary to be different in the two states. Comparing the results in Figures 8 and 9, 
we again see a similar pattern.  
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Figure 9. Difference-in-differences estimate, controlling for experience, allowing the effect of experience to differ by state. 
 If Act 10 changed the relationship between experience and pay in Wisconsin, these 
changes would only be seen following the passage of the legislation. Figure 10 allows for the 
effect of experience to be different in each year for each state. Figure 10 confirms the pattern 
shown in Figures 7, 8, and 9 of an increase in average teacher salaries in Wisconsin following 
Act 10.  
Missouri
WisconsinAct 10
$35,000
$37,000
$39,000
$41,000
$43,000
$45,000
$47,000
$49,000
$51,000
$53,000
$55,000
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
A
ve
ra
ge
 S
al
ar
y
Allowing For Different Effects of Year by State and Experience by 
State
32 
 
 
Figure 10. Difference-in-differences estimate, controlling for experience, allowing the effect of experience to differ by state 
within each year. 
It was widely believed that following Act 10 teachers’ salaries would decrease. 
Examining the salary data for the years before and after Act 10 this belief does not come to pass. 
This is an example of perceived effects potentially not aligning with the actual effects of a state 
policy.  
Conclusion 
 Teachers in Wisconsin certainly hold strong feelings regarding Act 10 and the 
overwhelming majority of them are negative. While there were substantial changes to unions and 
collective bargaining in the state of Wisconsin that came with Act 10, the strong belief that 
teachers’ salaries would be negatively impacted does not seem to have come to pass. Salaries of 
teachers, assuming they would have followed the same increasing trajectory and holding 
experience constant, tended to increase more in Wisconsin than in Missouri post-Act 10. Even if 
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salaries did not increase there was a belief that they decrease and these models show that there 
was most certainly not a decrease in teacher salaries following Act 10. These findings do not 
take into account changes to teacher benefit packages, as those are impossible to quantify 
considering the massive number of changes that each school district could have made to their 
policies on that matter. Being able to quantify teacher benefit changes would be possible only if 
the personal value a teacher put on their personal benefits before and after Act 10 could be 
determined, as well as how their personal perception of the value relates to the actual changes in 
price. The differing personal values on quality of benefits, as well as the fact that the data only 
provided the dollar amount the district paid for a teacher’s benefits, makes the changes to 
benefits impossible to quantify.   
 There are a couple potential reasons Act 10 may have prompted heated reactions. It is 
likely that union members were left-of-center and would disagree with policies from a right-of-
center governor like Scott Walker. As reflected in the survey years following Act 10, a 
philosophical commitment to a union idea rather than making a personal analysis of the policy 
seems to be at play. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to say with any certainty that it 
is partisan beliefs that led to the significant uprising regarding this policy. Hundreds of thousands 
of people disagreed with the governor on this policy, and it was the spotlight of national news for 
months up until his unsuccessful recall election. Why Wisconsin was a breeding ground for such 
a vast and harsh backlash when other states have implemented similar policies is also beyond the 
scope of this paper but, nonetheless, a very intriguing question. 
 There is without question room for more literature on the topic of Act 10 specifically and 
the local impacts it may have had. Biasi’s piece seems to be the only literature that analyzes the 
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local effects on teacher quality.36  However, none question whether the perceived beliefs driven 
by unions are backed up by what truly happened. This empirical research did not show such 
decreases in salaries, as was believed by many which may have been the result of union rhetoric. 
This has a significant effect locally because political framing can impact things like political 
choices, how taxpayer dollars are spent, and how policies are implemented. For example, 
Kaukauna used the freedoms Act 10 gave to administration to turn a deficit into a surplus and 
rehire teachers. If more districts had framed Act 10 as this sort of opportunity the negative 
connotations with the legislation may not be as severe and more districts would have followed 
Kaukauna’s path. But, following the backlash getting behind the policy was a dicey move 
considering the potential harm it would have on administrator and teacher relationships. Future 
literature could also analyze more states than Missouri to compare to Wisconsin. An analysis of 
all state salaries could allow us to view if the changes in Wisconsin following Act 10 aligned 
with national trends at the time.  
Public policy in the future can use this methodology as a gauge for the true effects of 
policies. Political rhetoric and framing of policies will not always fit the true impacts of a policy 
especially if an organization has substantial political clout. Public policies and their effectiveness 
are not easy to measure to begin with but, it can be suggested that future policies not be judged 
based off the rhetoric surrounding them. In the case of teachers’ pay and teachers’ unions it may 
be considered that unions negatively impacted the framing of the debate and struck unnecessary 
fear into teachers because their political strength was in jeopardy. The biggest takeaway from 
                                                             
36 Biasi, Barbara. “Unions, Salaries, and the Market for Teachers: Evidence from Wisconsin.” 
 2016.  https://web.stanford.edu/~bbiasi/jmp.pdf (October 1, 2017). 
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this research is that before judging the merit of a policy based off political rhetoric the true 
impacts should be measured first.   
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Appendix A (Survey Questions) 
 
This appendix displays a full list of survey questions. Teachers were asked to rate whether they 
strongly agreed or did not agree/did not care on the topic.  
1. How many years have you been a teacher?  
2. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
3. At what level do you currently teach?  
4. How many students are enrolled in your school district?  
5. If you chose to become a teacher in the last 7 years did any state politics impact it? 
 5a. If so, please explain.  
6. The current state budget proposal for funds to K-12 education will better education. 
7. Changes in policies like Common Core have made me feel like I have less autonomy in the 
classroom.   
8. Common Core has overall benefited the education of students.  
9. Have changes in ability to collectively bargain impacted you?  
10. Is teaching the only career you have had?  
11. Were you a teacher when Wisconsin's Act 10 was passed in 2011?  
12. If you answered yes to the previous question, have you seen changes in teachers' handbooks 
since 2011?  
13. How much did your teacher's handbook change after Act 10?   
14. How, if at all, have teacher/administrator relationships been impacted by state politics (ex. 
Act 10)?   
15. The procedures for teacher performance evaluations are more satisfactory after Act 10.   
16. I have more autonomy over my classroom after Act 10.   
17. My job is less secure after Act 10.   
18. Act 10 negatively impacted collective bargaining policies.   
19. If there were positive impacts, please briefly describe what they are.   
20. How greatly did Act 10 impact how much you pay for your benefits (ex. 
insurance/healthcare)?   
21. Did Act 10 negatively impact your salary? (If you do not feel comfortable answering this 
question feel free to leave it blank.)   
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22. 8 years later, does Act 10 still impact your attitudes regarding state politics?   
23. If yes, why? Please explain.   
24. Were you ever a member of a teachers’ association (union)?   
25. Are you currently a member of a teachers’ association (union)?   
26. If you were or are a member of WEAC did you feel better represented because of it?  
27. Teachers associations makes you feel like you have stronger political representation on the 
state level.  
28. Teachers associations make for better training of teachers.   
29. If you were a member of a teachers’ union and chose to leave please explain what the biggest 
contributing factors were.   
30. Please include any other opinions, comments, or relevant information to my research. If you 
would like to share your school district you could here as well. 
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Appendix B (Regression Results) 
This appendix shows regression results for the five regression models corresponding with 
Figures 6 through 10. The variables are shown in the leftmost column. The first row for each 
variable has the coefficient, while the second row has the robust standard error in parentheses. 
Blank indicates that variables was not included in that model. The asterisks indicate statistical 
significance, with * denoting statistical significance at the 10% level, ** denoting statistical 
significant at the 5% level, and *** denoting statistical significance at the 1% level. The average 
salary for each year in each state was calculated using the coefficients and the average level of 
experience and then displayed in the figures.  
 
Figure 6 Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9 Figure 10 
2009 -931.82*** -1298.38*** -1135.91*** -1150.31*** -1022.67***  
(45.76) (61.02) (53.39) (53.05) (84.90) 
2011 2687.51*** 1607.05*** 1531.50*** 1538.20*** 1065.06***  
(47.74) (63.81) (55.89) (55.65) (93.29) 
2012 3403.75*** 2632.06*** 2611.81*** 2613.61*** 1882.07***  
(48.65) (64.71) (56.69) (56.47) (96.00) 
2013 4641.27*** 3987.34*** 4000.30*** 3999.15*** 2968.52***  
(49.62) (65.87) (57.65) (57.47) (98.29) 
2014 5849.36*** 5405.25*** 5523.10*** 5512.65*** 4017.96***  
(50.15) (67.09) (58.62) (58.50) (100.95) 
2015 5871.82*** 6137.42*** 6279.12*** 6266.56*** 4522.04***  
(50.61) (67.73) (59.12) (59.03) (102.55) 
2016 7463.46*** 7109.94*** 7214.90*** 7205.59*** 5179.35***  
(50.72) (68.32) (59.51) (59.45) (103.64) 
WI 6503.92*** 
    
 
(25.24) 
    
WI2009 
 
6383.67*** 4967.80*** 3153.04*** 3812.61***   
(62.71) (52.52) (62.47) (87.34) 
WI2010 
 
5603.87*** 4179.91*** 2334.97*** 2921.62***   
(67.30) (57.57) (66.60) (99.72) 
WI2011 
 
7890.06*** 6375.86*** 4509.27*** 5197.74***   
(68.25) (57.80) (66.85) (105.07) 
WI2012 
 
7246.53*** 6112.73*** 4290.72*** 4326.36***   
(70.96) (60.04) (67.60) (112.53) 
WI2013 
 
6995.44*** 5841.65*** 4023.80*** 3506.10***   
(73.67) (61.90) (68.80) (115.92) 
WI2014 
 
6548.89*** 5417.30*** 3620.38*** 2961.25***   
(75.01) (62.37) (68.64) (115.42) 
WI2015 
 
5035.24*** 3877.09*** 2081.09*** 1643.66***   
(76.12) (63.39) (69.50) (114.07) 
WI2016 
 
6354.50*** 5098.30*** 3289.21*** 2722.98*** 
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(76.43) (62.90) (68.97) (116.26) 
exp 
  
758.12*** 690.92*** 
 
   
(1.63) (2.49) 
 
expWI 
   
136.06*** 
 
    
(3.23) 
 
exp2009 
    
608.93***      
(5.62) 
exp2010 
    
620.45***      
(5.96) 
exp2011 
    
658.24***      
(6.64) 
exp2012 
    
678.50***      
(7.08) 
exp2013 
    
702.22***      
(7.40) 
exp2014 
    
739.61***      
(7.84) 
exp2015 
    
759.85***      
(8.03) 
exp2016 
    
782.18***      
(8.16) 
expWI2009 
    
100.55***      
(7.17) 
expWI2010 
    
104.73***      
(7.93) 
expWI2011 
    
93.69***      
(8.49) 
expWI2012 
    
134.85***      
(9.48) 
expWI2013 
    
171.52***      
(9.89) 
expWI2014 
    
178.11***      
(10.17) 
expWI2015 
    
159.78***      
(10.09) 
expWI2016 
    
165.62***      
(10.31) 
Intercept 39326.17*** 39749.14*** 30191.74*** 31038.86*** 31927.29***  
(35.10) (43.73) (40.57) (44.54) (61.99) 
N 1,023,439 1,023,439 1,023,230 1,023,230 1,023,230 
R-sq 0.101 0.102 0.367 0.369 0.372 
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